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Russia‟s international behavior during the last decade puzzles many American observers. As seen 
from Washington, the greatest current challenges—terrorism, nuclear proliferation, climate 
change—are global ones that threaten all states. The US, the world‟s only remaining superpower, 
has been trying to organize multilateral responses. Yet, on issue after issue, the Kremlin has 
proved singularly unhelpful. For years, Russian negotiators stalled efforts to compel Iran and 
North Korea to give up nuclear weapons or weapons programs. Moscow has applied economic 
and diplomatic pressure to keep nearby states from joining NATO or letting American troops use 
their bases to fight the Taliban in Afghanistan. In late 2008, Russia invaded its southern neighbor 
Georgia and effectively detached two mountain enclaves from its territory.  
 More recently, some have seen hints of a thaw. Last June, Presidents Obama and 
Medvedev chatted over hamburgers in Washington and announced that their countries‟ 
relationship had been “reset.” Moscow has signed a new treaty to replace the expiring START 
and backed a UN resolution tightening sanctions on Iran. Yet, in other ways, the Kremlin 
continues to disappoint and shock. Russian leaders only agreed to sanctions on Iran that permitted 
them to continue selling the country nuclear power stations and, apparently, developing its oil and 
gas sectors. Reset or no reset, in 2009 Russia conducted military exercises simulating an invasion 
of Poland, and it has deployed advanced anti-aircraft missiles south of its border in Abkhazia.   
 To explain such behavior, officials and commentators appeal to psychology. The 
Russians, they say, are acting out of injured pride. Traumatized by their fall from superpower 
status, Russians are furious at not being accorded the respect they feel they deserve. Impulsive, 
emotionally unstable, and often paranoid, they lash out violently at their neighbors in an attempt 
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to cauterize the wound of recent history and rekindle their lost sense of grandeur. Or, in the 
mildest version of the critique, Russians are merely mentally rigid, unable to discard an obsolete 
way of thinking and adapt to 21
st
 Century realities.  
 Such views, we argue, are based on a deep misunderstanding of Russian motivations. Of 
course, the country‟s leaders would like to be treated with respect—who would not? It is also true 
that many citizens feel diminished by the decline in their country‟s status, and that Kremlin 
rhetoric often sounds this note. However, the real reason the US finds Russia so uncooperative 
lies not in psychology but in objective calculations of national interest.  
Contrary to common belief, Russia and the US today share few interests, and even fewer 
priorities. Where their interests do overlap, Russian leaders often doubt the efficacy of the US 
strategy and so are reluctant to contribute in costly ways. Moreover, there is an imbalance. 
Whereas the US, in its role as global problem-solver, needs Russia‟s help in numerous regards, 
Russia needs the US for relatively little. Its main demand is entirely negative: that Washington 
stop extending NATO up to its borders and emboldening anti-Russian groups on its periphery. 
Since the West has defined compromise on NATO enlargement as appeasement, opportunities for 
deeper cooperation are limited.  
Although our argument has discouraging implications for the next few years, we offer 
reasons to be more sanguine about the medium term. While retaining its independent identity, 
Russia has, nevertheless, been integrating into Europe more than most observers realize. As its 
economy develops further, we expect this to continue. Although the interests of Russia and the 
US will always diverge in some ways, the overlap is likely to grow gradually as the country 
modernizes. In the meantime, negotiating limited agreements on areas of mutual benefit will be 
easier if US policymakers recognize that Russian positions are rooted in a reasonably plausible 
view of Russia‟s interests in the world.  
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Psycho analysis 
Although Washington‟s psychologists all attribute Russia‟s conduct to its leaders‟ complexes, 
they differ in the details of their diagnoses.  
A first view is that Russian leaders are emotionally volatile and confused about their true 
interests. In the 1990s, their opposition to NATO‟s expansion into Eastern Europe and outrage at 
its bombing of Serbia were often taken for symptoms of hysteria. At one meeting in 1994, 
Russia‟s President Yeltsin reminded President Clinton that “NATO was created in Cold War 
times” and warned that extending it into Central Europe would “sow the seeds of distrust.” The 
American president and his entourage were “stunned” by this announcement, according to one 
aide. To Clinton‟s advisor Strobe Talbott, Yeltsin‟s behavior seemed “erratic.” Clinton 
complained that the Russian president‟s speech had “rattled his confidence in Yeltsin‟s 
emotional, physical and political stability.”1 In the 1990s, American officials spent many hours 
trying to soothe Russian nerves and persuade their counterparts that US policies were actually in 
Russia‟s interest as well. Among themselves, they called this “administering the spinach 
treatment,” and joked about how hard it was to get the Russians to swallow. “The more you tell 
them it‟s good for them,” Talbott‟s assistant explained, “the more they gag.”2 
 Others attribute Russia‟s resistance not to temper tantrums and immaturity but to 
wounded pride and resentment at the loss of superpower status. As former ambassador Richard 
Burt put it in 2006, political reform in Russia was unlikely to succeed because of the country‟s 
“sense of humiliation and loss stemming from the end of the Cold War.”3 When in August 2008 
Georgian troops shelled the South Ossetian capital Tskhinvali and Russian forces invaded, 
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pundits put this down to the Russian leaders‟ “brewing rage at their lost grandeur” and their 
obsession with “getting respect.”4 
 A third common diagnosis is paranoia. Russia could not seriously feel threatened by the  
advance of NATO towards its borders, the placing of anti-missile batteries in Eastern Europe, or 
the hostility of some of its neighbors. Rather, said Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Moscow 
officials were giving in to a “paranoid, aggressive impulse.”5 “To understand why the Kremlin 
acts the way it does,” one commentator wrote even before the Georgian war, “one must first 
recognize how haunted it is by uncertainty and paranoia.”6  
 Fourth, Russian leaders‟ coolness towards US projects is sometimes seen as the result of 
socialization into a “Cold War mentality.” The Kremlin‟s ambassadors miss opportunities to 
promote their country‟s interests because they cannot discard outdated modes of thinking. 
Russian Prime Minister Putin, said President Obama in 2009, shortly before flying to meet him, 
still had “one foot in the old ways of doing business.”7 
 Each of these diagnoses implies a particular course of treatment. If the problem is 
childish rebellion or confusion, Washington‟s emissaries should repeat American positions in a 
calm but firm voice as often as necessary, explaining how these are also good for Russia. For 
emotional instability, the prescription is psychotherapy. With Yeltsin, Clinton counseled Talbott, 
the goal should be to help the Russian president “absorb” or “internalize” NATO enlargement as 
“one of those things in life that you can‟t avoid—you just have to get used to and learn to live 
with.”8 If the source of trouble is humiliation and wounded pride, two approaches might work. 
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The West might win over Russian leaders by treating them with ostentatious respect. As former 
National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft put it, “We need to convince the Russians that we 
take them seriously and their views do matter.”9 Alternatively, one might seek concessions by 
threatening to withhold the symbols of status that Kremlin officials supposedly cherish, such as 
membership in the G8. “The upside of Russia‟s preoccupation with lost status,” writes the 
commentator Samantha Power, “is that its exclusion from such elite organizations would sting.”10  
If, on the other hand, Russia‟s leaders are paranoid and irrationally aggressive, 
Washington‟s priority should be to arm their potential victims, enabling them to defend 
themselves. Finally, if the Kremlin‟s older statesmen are wedded to antagonistic, Cold War ways 
of thinking, it may make sense to place one‟s chips on the younger generation. At the July 2009 
Moscow summit, according to one well-connected Washington reporter, President Obama 
planned to “build up” the more congenial Medvedev vis-à-vis Putin.11   
 During the last 20 years, the psychological approach to Russia policy has been tried 
repeatedly, in different variations. There is no evidence that it has helped Washington achieve its 
objectives. On the contrary, these treatments seem to have irritated and antagonized Russian 
leaders without rendering their behavior any more amenable to American goals. Perhaps at this 
point it is worth trying another approach.   
 
What Russia wants 
Another way to make sense of Russia‟s behavior is to consider how its leaders construe their 
country‟s interests. As best we can tell, foreign policy under Putin and Medvedev has been 
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shaped by three key objectives—securing economic growth, fostering friendly regimes in other 
former Soviet states, and preventing terrorism at home. All three are goals the average Russian 
should favor. More to the point, to the Kremlin‟s current occupants succeeding in these endeavors 
must seem critical to hanging on to power.  
Economic growth comes first, for several reasons. Looking outward, Putin and Medvedev 
have absorbed the lesson that authority in today‟s world rests on economic might. “There can be 
no superpower,” Putin insisted even before taking office, “where weakness and poverty reign,”12 
Looking inward, they know they owe their prodigious approval ratings to the economy‟s revival 
since 1999. They may or may not care about popularity for its own sake. But on the Russian 
political battlefield, a falling rating is a signal of weakness. Like blood in the water, it provokes 
the sharks to attack. As Yeltsin‟s popularity plummeted in the 1990s, coalitions of regional 
governors, businessmen, opposition deputies, and others blocked his policy initiatives and 
undermined federal law enforcement, driving his approval ever lower.
13
 Even authoritarian 
leaders know that maintaining control over a population of admirers is easier than repressing a 
nation of critics. And maintaining control is clearly the current leaders‟ top priority.  
Russia‟s economic revival in the last decade has been remarkable. Gross domestic 
product per capita, adjusted for purchasing power parity, increased from less than $7,000 in 1999 
to almost $16,000 in 2008—around that of Ireland in 1987 or Portugal in 1989.14 The government 
repaid all its loans to the IMF and reduced its foreign debt to about 2 percent of GDP, less than 
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the annual state deficit of many G20 countries.
15
 Even after the recent global crisis, Russia‟s 
currency reserves—just $8 billion in 1999—stood at $476 billion, the third largest in the world, 
exceeded only by those of China and Japan.
16
 Incomes of both rich and poor Russians surged, 
rising by more than 8 percent a year in 2000-08.  
Oil and gas played a major role in this boom. Economists estimate that rising petroleum 
prices account for one third to one half of the growth between 1999 and 2008.
17
 Hydrocarbons 
provide about one third of budget revenues.
18
 Putin and Medvedev are eager to modernize the 
economy and diversify away from natural resources. In recent years, they have set up a state 
corporation to develop nanotechnology and an “innovation city” outside Moscow to incubate high 
technology projects. Still, at present high technology industries contribute only about 3 percent of 
GDP.
19
 Russia‟s leaders realize that, at least for the next 10 years, the country‟s prosperity will 
depend on securing stable markets and relatively high prices for its oil and gas.  
Given recent history, the two leaders must be terrified of how a serious weakening of this 
trade would affect their regime. It was no mere coincidence that the Soviet Union collapsed a few 
years after oil prices plunged in the early 1980s. (The oil market was not the only factor, but it 
was an important one.
20
) Russia‟s default and devaluation of 1998, which ruined the reputation of 
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the country‟s reformers, came after oil prices hit the unprecedented low of nine dollars a barrel.21 
Putin and Medvedev know that not just the country‟s prosperity but their own political survival 
depends on keeping the revenues from hydrocarbons flowing.  
Russia‟s reliance on energy exports shapes how its leaders view the world. Most of the 
country‟s oil and gas exports go to Europe. Western analysts have seen this trade as creating 
vulnerability for Russia‟s European customers, exposing them to political pressure from the 
Kremlin. In 2008 British Prime Minister Gordon Brown warned that Europe risked being caught 
in “an energy stranglehold” by “states such as Russia,” that were “increasingly using their energy 
resources as policy tools.”22 In fact, when examined closely, it is Russia’s dependence on the 
European market that is most striking.  
The European Union‟s 27 members import about 28 percent of their crude oil, 23 percent 
of their gas, and 15 percent of their hard coal from Russia. Together, these imports account for 
about 18 percent of total EU energy consumption.
23
 Some individual countries are much more 
dependent. The Russian share in gas supplies tends to increase as one moves from west to east 
across the continent. Whereas in 2007 France, Italy, and Germany relied on Russia for, 
respectively, 14, 27, and 36 percent of their gas, the figure was 48 percent for Poland, 92 percent 
for Bulgaria, and 100 percent for the three Baltic states.
24
 This creates a natural division within 
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Europe between the western countries, many of which have more reason to feel threatened by 
OPEC than by Moscow, and the smaller eastern countries, which look to the EU or the US to 
 finance alternative pipelines and provide backup in disputes with Moscow over pricing.
25
    
For Russia, the European market is absolutely vital. Europe, including the Baltic states, 
accounts for about 67 percent of its gas exports. Former Soviet countries make up the other 33 
percent.
26
 Similarly, as of 2007, 69 percent of Russia‟s oil exports flowed to Europe, while 
another 14 percent went to former Soviet destinations.
27
 Given the extent to which Russia‟s 
national income and state budget depend on this trade, to lose its European clients would be a 
calamity. 
Conscious of this, the Kremlin has been understandably unenthusiastic about projects to 
build competing pipelines that would supply Europe with gas from Central Asia. The EU- and 
US-supported Nabucco pipeline, designed to carry Azerbaijani—and perhaps one day Iranian—
gas through Turkey and Eastern Europe to Austria, looks from Moscow like a serious threat to the 
country‟s prosperity. Russia‟s state-controlled gas company Gazprom has maneuvered feverishly 
to prevent it from being built, trying to buy up all the gas that Nabucco would transport and 
planning a rival “South Stream” pipeline across many of the same countries. Eager to lock in 
demand, Gazprom has bought equity in the distributors and networks in its principal markets, 
from Italy and Germany to Eastern Europe. The “Nord Stream” pipeline, currently being tunneled 
under the Baltic from Vyborg to Greifswald, aims to provide dependable deliveries to Northern 
Europe, bypassing Ukraine and Belarus, where gas has sometimes been siphoned off in transit.  
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Even as it maneuvered in this way, Russia‟s gas industry has been knocked off balance 
by an even more alarming development. In recent years, global production of liquefied natural 
gas (LNG) has taken off, boosting supplies just as the financial crisis shrank demand. Prices in 
Europe have plunged, and buyers have been wriggling out of their long-term contracts. 
Simultaneously, new prospects for the extraction of gas trapped in common shale deposits have 
raised the possibility that Europe will itself soon produce all the gas it needs. A central pillar of 
Russia‟s political economy suddenly looks rickety.  
 Energy also colors the complicated relationship between Russia, China, and Central Asia. 
On the one hand, China‟s explosive growth promises an expanding market for Russian mineral 
exports. On the other hand, China has skillfully played Moscow off against Central Asian 
petroleum producers, exploiting competition to get the best deals. Russia, while not happy to be 
undercut by its southern neighbors, nevertheless prefers that they sell to Asia rather than Europe. 
Since 2006, Kazakh oil has fed the refineries of Xinjiang province, and a gas pipeline from 
Turkmenistan opened in December 2009. By comparison, Russia‟s energy trade with China has 
developed slowly. Beijing helped finance construction of a trans-Siberian pipeline to ship oil to 
its northern provinces, the final link of which was completed in late 2010, and an agreement was 
signed in 2009 on another pipeline to provide China with up to 70 billion cubic meters of gas a 
year.
28
 As its European sales shrink, Russia urgently needs trade with China to pick up the slack. 
In 2009-2010, Medvedev met with Chinese President Hu Jintao no fewer than five times to 
facilitate commerce and a flurry of new deals were signed in September 2010. 
29
   
 In Russia‟s energy politics, national priorities interweave with the parochial interests of 
top officials, who identify closely with major corporations on whose boards they serve. Kremlin 
energy barons would like to see these companies dominating markets, obtaining assets abroad, 
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and materially benefiting key insiders. Until recently, Russian gas was sold to Ukraine via a 
controversial firm that the US Justice Department‟s Organized Crime Unit was reportedly 
investigating.
30
 Gazprom‟s pipeline construction costs have been so high—$3 million per 
kilometer, compared to a world average of $1 - $1.5 million, according to the liberal Putin critics 
Boris Nemtsov and Vladimir Milov—that some doubt whether mere managerial incompetence 
can explain the overruns.
31
  
Clearly, the interests of Kremlin insiders and ordinary Russians do not always coincide. 
But it would be wrong to see Moscow‟s positions on oil and gas as a mere outgrowth of 
corruption. Russia‟s dependence on energy exports to Europe would be just as great even with a 
team of committed democrats and scrupulous public servants in the Kremlin. Such an 
administration would probably find more effective ways to manage this dependence, and might 
negotiate in a more open and cooperative manner. But the basic conflict of interest between 
buyers and sellers would remain. Russian democrats, too, would prefer that Bulgarians buy their 
gas from Gazprom rather than Azerbaijan‟s SOCAR, and that Belarusans and Estonians pay 
higher prices, closer to those charged to Germans and Italians.  
 Russia‟s second key interest is in the prevalence of friendly governments in neighboring 
states. There is nothing unusual in this, although, of course, neighboring governments should be 
free to decide for themselves how friendly they feel. Beyond the normal desire not to be encircled 
by hostile regimes, Russia has particular sensitivities associated with the fact that when the Soviet 
Union collapsed about 25 million ethnic Russians were left on the other side of state borders. Of 
these, about 16 million remain in the “near abroad.” When Russians perceive governments to be 
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discriminating against their co-ethnics—as, for instance, when Estonia instituted a difficult 
language exam that made it hard for local Russians to acquire citizenship—Kremlin leaders come 
under public pressure to speak out (although not to take military action: opinion polls show 
majorities against this). Moscow strongly opposes further enlargement of NATO to the east. 
Again, this is hardly surprising. No great power—or minor state—would welcome the extension 
of a historically hostile military alliance up to its borders, no matter how often that alliance said 
its intentions were peaceable.  
 Some see in Putin‟s foreign policy a more sinister design: to reimpose Russian hegemony 
over the former Soviet states, and perhaps even parts of Eastern Europe, by means of economic 
and military pressures and threats. As evidence, proponents of this view generally point to the 
2008 Russian invasion of Georgia, along with Gazprom‟s periodic halting of gas supplies to 
Ukraine and Belarus, the Kremlin‟s alleged support for a cyber-attack on Estonia in 2007, and 
various statements by Putin expressing sadness over the Soviet Union‟s dissolution.  
 Unable as we are to read Putin‟s mind, we cannot absolutely rule out such a possibility. 
However, considered in full, the facts do not provide much basis for belief in an expansionist 
plan. In most regards, Russia‟s policies have been extremely cautious.  
 Since the late 1980s, rather than enlarging its global presence, Russia has been 
demilitarizing and retreating into its borders. It spent the last two decades closing military bases 
abroad. In the 1990s, Russian troops left Eastern Europe and the Baltic states, and total active 
duty forces under Moscow‟s command fell from 3.4 million to around 1 million. Since then, 
Russia has abandoned bases in Cuba and Vietnam and cut its troops deployed to former Soviet 
countries. Under Putin, those in Moldova fell from 2,600 to 1,500, and those in Tajikistan from 
8,200 to 5,500. In the years before the 2008 war in South Ossetia, Putin closed three military 
bases in Georgia and reduced Russia‟s troops in that country from 5,000 to 1,000.32 Host states 
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would have preferred the troop withdrawals to be even faster. Nevertheless, they are not what one 
would expect of a revisionist power. 
 A regime committed to expansion would have behaved quite differently. It would have 
found an opportunity to stir up Russian nationalists in border regions of the Baltic states, Eastern 
Ukraine, or the Crimea; engineered a violent confrontation; and sent in Russian troops to help the 
secessionists. In Georgia, a revisionist Russia would have annexed South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
long ago, before President Saakashvili embarked on his military buildup, rather than withdrawing 
troops and closing bases. It would not have waited to act until Georgian forces were killing its 
peacekeepers. To many in the West, Russia‟s 2008 invasion seemed to be positive proof of the 
Kremlin‟s land hunger. But a Russian leader bent on expansion would surely have ordered troops 
all the way to Tbilisi to depose Saakashvili and install a more congenial government. At the very 
least, he would have taken control of the important oil and gas pipelines that cross Georgia. In 
fact, Russian forces neither bombed nor seized these, and the troops soon withdrew to the 
secessionist mountain enclaves.   
 Moscow‟s recent efforts to win friends and influence in its neighborhood have not been a 
noted success. The Commonwealth of Independent States, supposedly the instrument of Russian 
domination, is visibly falling apart; only six of the 11 presidents bothered to attend the last 
meeting, which lasted all of 30 minutes.
33
 Not even the supposedly dependent dictator of Belarus, 
Aleksandr Lukashenko, would agree to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. The Kremlin had to look as far afield as Central America and the Pacific island of Nauru 
to line up support. In Kyrgyzstan, after Moscow allocated the country more than $2 billion in 
loans and aid in 2009, President Kurmanbek Bakiyev acceded to Russia‟s request that he close 
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the US airbase on his territory. But he promptly reneged when the US offered to increase the rent. 
In a sense, the Kremlin had the last laugh when a few months later pro-democracy protesters, 
with Moscow‟s approval, overthrew Bakiyev.34 However, the US base remains open. Lukashenko 
took the opportunity to thumb his nose at Putin, offering Bakiyev asylum in Minsk. His guest was 
accused of inciting ethnic pogroms that broke out in Kyrgyzstan in June 2010, resulting in at least 
300 deaths. 
Has dependence on Russian gas given Moscow political leverage over countries to its 
west? There is little sign of this. One might suppose the most dependent countries would be the 
most deferential. In fact, it is precisely these states—Poland, the Czech Republic, Estonia—that 
have persistently sought to tweak the bear‟s nose. Within just a few years, the leaders of countries 
dependent on Russia for much or all of their gas and oil have joined NATO, invited in US anti-
missile batteries, and subjected Russian policies to vociferous criticism. These countries were the 
ones that lobbied most insistently to get Georgia rapidly admitted to NATO.
35
 By contrast, it has 
been the less dependent West Europeans in Italy and Germany that have proven more 
sympathetic to the Kremlin.  
Some see the periodic “gas wars,” in which Gazprom has sought to raise the prices paid 
by Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, and other countries, as attempts at political intimidation. Given the 
prevailing coolness between Moscow and most of its neighbors, there have usually been political 
undertones. Yet the fact remains that for years Russia has continued to sell gas to countries with 
regimes it considers hostile for a fraction of the price it has charged its West European friends. In 
2005, Russia sold gas to the Orange Revolutionaries of Ukraine for $52 per thousand cubic 
meters (tcms), compared to the $197 per tcm it charged Germany. Transport costs might explain 
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part of the difference. But Russia continued to supply gas cheaply to the Baltic states—even after 
they joined NATO—for far less than it charged neighboring Finland. In 2005, the Baltics were 
paying $90-95 per tcm, while Finland paid $148.
36
  
Why Russia sold its gas at such a discount to countries in Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union is not clear. Of course, Moscow was not altruistic. Gazprom‟s motives probably 
combined several elements. These may have included rational price discrimination: a smart 
monopolist takes into account different clients‟ ability to pay. In the early 1990s, Gazprom 
sharply raised the price of gas for the Baltic states, but lowered it again when demand fell by two 
thirds.
37
 In part, Gazprom hoped to exchange low prices for equity in pipelines and distribution 
systems, locking in future demand. In part, Russian leaders may have thought cheap gas would 
improve relations with the favored countries or at least avoid explosive fights. Considering how 
little Russia got for its price concessions, the Kremlin‟s rethinking of this policy around 2005 
should astonish no one.  
In fact, the lesson of recent gas wars is roughly the opposite of that derived by most 
commentators. Rather than demonstrating political leverage, Moscow‟s temporary gas shutoffs to 
Ukraine show how little clout the Kremlin actually had. Given Russia‟s dependence on the 
confidence of its high-paying West European customers, disrupting supplies to these customers 
could only be an act of desperation. That the Kremlin had to shoot itself in the foot to get Kiev‟s 
attention reveals the limits of its blackmail potential.  
Russia‟s third key goal is preventing terrorism at home. Here is not the place to review 
the dismal history of federal military efforts in Chechnya. Suffice it to say that today a serious 
terrorist threat arises from Islamic fundamentalist groups based in various parts of the North 
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Caucasus. The Kremlin is determined to limit external support to these groups. This concern 
influences its positions on Afghanistan, Iran, and Central Asia, in ways we discuss below.  
 In short, one cannot be certain about the Kremlin‟s objectives. But the pattern of behavior 
to date can be easily understood as reflecting a relatively coherent view of Russia‟s national 
interests. In their foreign policy, the country‟s leaders seek three things: high economic growth, 
which in the short run requires secure export markets and sufficiently high prices for oil and gas; 
friendly neighbors; and an environment that does not exacerbate their problems with domestic 
Islamic terrorism.  
 That the Kremlin‟s policies are purposeful does not mean that they are always 
intelligently conceived and executed. There are plenty of examples of apparent bungling or self-
defeating populism. On the economic front, the government pours billions of dollars into projects 
that seem doomed—trying to boost stock prices with state purchases, for instance, or bailing out 
the decrepit car manufacturer AvtoVAZ. In a blizzard of anti-market activism, Putin orders 
supermarkets to lower their prices and entrepreneurs to reopen unprofitable plants, slaps a ban on 
grain exports, and exiles all casinos to four remote regions, destroying thousands of jobs. 
Moscow‟s latest investments in high technology might yield something of value; more likely, 
they will spawn a new generation of white elephants. So far, the Kremlin has shrunk from 
implementing the measures most likely to actually promote rapid growth—thorough reforms of 
law enforcement and the judiciary and curbs on corruption throughout the bureaucracy. In 
relations with the West, officials sometimes seem determined to hand ammunition to the 
Russophobes. If, as many believe, the polonium poisoning of Aleksandr Litvinenko in 2006 was 
ordered by someone high up in the Kremlin, it is hard to see what benefit the leaders could derive 
from this that would outweigh the risk of severe harm to Russia‟s global image and relations with 
Britain.  
 Nor do we mean to argue that decision-makers are always dispassionate. Policies are 
made by personalities, in Russia as elsewhere. To those around him, Putin appears intensely 
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competitive, such a master of one-upmanship that a journalist could joke, on seeing US Secretary 
of Defense Robert Gates arrive for a negotiation with a broken hand, that he half-expected Putin 
to appear with a broken leg. Putin may have yielded to frustration rather than exercising measured 
judgment on occasion, as when he announced in mid-2009 that Russia would enter the WTO only 
as part of a trade bloc with Kazakhstan and Belarus. (The Kremlin later backtracked.) But such 
cases are the exception. For the most part, Russia‟s policies have been purposeful, cautious, 
and—even when misguided—reasonably consistent. The question, then, is whether the purposes 
behind these policies lend themselves to practical cooperation with the US. 
 
Why the US needs Russia 
As the world‟s only superpower, the US conceives its role today as one of global leadership. No 
other country has the power and wealth to coordinate responses to the most pressing international 
problems. The style has changed as Bush-era unilateralism gave way to the multilateralism of 
Obama. But the vocation to direct remains the same. 
 The challenges, as seen from Washington, are daunting. In Afghanistan, Iraq, and 
Pakistan, Islamic insurgents threaten to take power and offer safe haven to terrorists. The US 
must find a way to stabilize these countries so it can reduce its troops in the first two, while 
avoiding their getting drawn into the third. Al Qaeda, although quieter, is not defeated. As 
Pakistan‟s government struggles against its own militants, there is a small but terrifying chance 
that its nuclear arsenal could fall under the control of aggressive anti-American forces.  
Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to new states has never been more difficult. 
The US hopes to stop Iran from building its own nuclear bombs, but time is running out. It would 
like to persuade North Korea to give up those it already has. Washington must worry about what 
would happen to these weapons were the Pyongyang dictatorship to collapse. In Prague in 2009, 
President Obama called for a nuclear-free world, and he would like to negotiate further large cuts, 
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extending those of the new START treaty signed with Russia in April 2010. As the polar ice-caps 
melt and Asia industrializes, reversing climate change is another priority, as is ensuring secure 
energy supplies for the US and its allies. After the recent financial disaster, sustaining the global 
recovery and preventing similar crises in the future are also high on the agenda.   
 Because of its geographical location, its nuclear status, its historic relationships with key 
countries where US interests are at stake, its seat on the UN Security Council, its roles as major 
energy exporter and commander of the largest military in Europe, even its significant US dollar 
reserves, Russia could either assist or complicate the pursuit of all these American foreign policy 
objectives. In numerous ways, Washington needs Moscow‟s help.  
 To fight the Taliban in Afghanistan, NATO has had to ship most of its supplies north 
from Pakistan via the Khyber Pass. But this route had trouble handling the necessary volume, and 
convoys were often ambushed. Russia‟s agreement to let NATO transport material south on its 
railways or through its airspace provided a much-needed alternative. Over the years, Russian 
nuclear scientists have developed close contacts with their Iranian counterparts through work on 
civilian projects. Although influence via such channels is limited, it just might help at the margin. 
Russia‟s acquiescence in the UN Security Council is necessary for any further sanctions or to 
legitimize other applications of pressure. (In June, Russia agreed to a new set of sanctions, but 
only ones that seemingly protected Russia‟s commercial interests in the country.) Likewise, any 
new UN measures against North Korea will require at least Russian abstention.  
 Further nuclear disarmament agreements are, of course, impossible without Russia‟s 
participation. Europe‟s dependence on Russian oil and gas should not be exaggerated, as already 
discussed. Still, the continent‟s energy security is obviously affected by Russian supplies. As the 
world‟s second largest oil exporter, Russia‟s sales influence the world price. No plan to combat 
climate change can ignore the pollution produced by Russia‟s industry. Finally, although this is 
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far less significant, Russia‟s dollar reserves and treasury bond holdings give it at least some 
marginal potential to affect the dollar‟s price.38  
  
Does Russia need the US?  
For the reasons just discussed, Russia‟s cooperation could make a big difference to the success or 
failure of American global policies. But is the reverse true? Does Russia need Washington‟s help 
to achieve its key goals? The short answer is no.  
 As a customer for Russian energy, the US is inconsequential. Russian exports of crude oil 
to the US during the last five years have ranged between about 2 and 4 percent of the total. 
America buys almost no Russian gas.
39
 That might change, if LNG from Sakhalin proves 
competitive. But no one is holding his breath.  
In fact, US and Russian energy interests mostly conflict. The mining of American shale 
gas freed up LNG shipments to inundate Europe, depressing prices. Washington, eager to wean 
its European friends from dependence on their Eastern neighbor, favors construction of rival 
pipelines such as Nabucco. Attempts by Gazprom to increase prices or pressure delinquent 
European clients to pay overdue bills provoke bursts of hostile rhetoric from Washington. If 
American conservation efforts succeed, this could reduce the world oil price on which Moscow 
relies. Given how the two sides see the energy issue, there is little room for cooperation.
40
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More generally, Russia and the US share few economic interests. Russia‟s recent 
development has not integrated it with the US. On the contrary, the two have become more 
economically disconnected. In 1995, 6 percent of Russia‟s exports went to the US; by 2009, the 
figure was 3 percent—less than Russia exported that year to Poland.41 The US supplies just 5 
percent of Russia‟s imports. In capital flows, the American share is also insignificant. As recently 
as 1995, 28 percent of all foreign investment in Russia came from the US. In mid-2010, the share 
was 2.5 percent, less than that of Ireland. Indeed, Russians had by then invested more in the US 
than Americans had in Russia.  
Russia‟s disengagement from the US contrasts with its growing ties to Europe and China. 
In 2009, Europe accounted for 52 percent of Russia‟s exports and 45 percent of its imports. 
Another 14 percent of its imports came from China, up from 2 percent in 1995. Although exports 
to China currently make up less than 6 percent of the total, this will rise as the country‟s hunger 
for raw materials grows. Europe‟s share of foreign investment in Russia increased from 41 
percent in 1995 to 71 percent as of early 2010, although much of this is Russian wealth 
repatriated from Cyprus, Switzerland, and Luxembourg.  
Moscow would certainly welcome more US private investment. Stumping for 
modernization in 2010, President Medvedev made a point of visiting MIT and Silicon Valley. He 
would like to encourage brilliant emigrés to return from the campuses of Cisco and Google. But 
American partnerships are by no means essential, and high technology ventures with Western 
Europe are likely to matter more, at least in the short run. Of the 1,649 commercial agreements 
registered in 2009 to import technologically advanced equipment and services into Russia, 61 
percent were with partners in the European Union; 11 percent were with American companies.
42
 
Volkswagen, Siemens, Peugeot-Citroen, and Mistubishi Motors have all opened factories in 
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Russia.
43
 In recent years, collaborations of Russian scientists with German, French, British, and 
Italian colleagues have resulted in more than twice as many published articles as have 
collaborations with American scholars. Of the ten institutions whose scholars co-authored most 
articles with Russian scientists, only one—MIT—was in the US; eight were in Europe.44 In the 
short run, Russian growth will depend more on copying and applying American innovations than 
on partnering with US scientists to create new ones. At the same time, perhaps more than is 
realized in Washington, the US‟s economic reputation has been dented by the financial crisis. In 
the 1990s, Russians considered the dollar the benchmark of security. In June 2010, by contrast, 
only 6 percent of Russians thought it was “most profitable and safe” to keep their money in 
dollars, compared to 46 percent who favored rubles and 11 percent who said Euros.
45
 The trends 
could change. American entrepreneurs might choose to gamble on Russia‟s modernization. But 
Europeans are already doing so.  
The US could help Russia over the last hurdles to membership in the World Trade 
Organization, a goal it has pursued for years. Yet on this Russia‟s interests are mixed. WTO 
membership would help certain sectors while hurting others, which could no longer be protected 
from foreign competition. Among potential victims is the automobile industry. During the crisis, 
the government raised tariffs on imported cars to prevent high unemployment. Around this time, 
enthusiasm for rapid WTO accession seemed to soften. (Some economists see large benefits from 
Russia‟s joining. But the largest ones would come not from WTO membership itself but from the 
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economic reforms required as conditions for accession.
46
 While the external pressure of the WTO 
negotiations might help defeat domestic lobbies, Putin and Medvedev could almost certainly 
overrule these lobbies by themselves if they considered such reforms a priority.)  
 On Russia‟s second key objective—promoting friendly regimes in its vicinity—the 
Kremlin does not expect American help. It would merely like the US to stop meddling in what it 
considers an unconstructive way. Washington, however, sees this as a matter of principle, and so 
a compromise is unlikely. In the American view, Moscow‟s attempts to influence the foreign 
policies or domestic politics of its neighbors violate their sovereignty. To counter such violations, 
the US has itself sought to influence the domestic politics and foreign policies of these countries, 
supporting governments and groups hostile towards Moscow, helping finance “colored 
revolutions” that bring anti-Moscow leaders to power, and pressing for rapid admission of these 
countries to NATO. While the momentum of such efforts has slowed under Obama, Washington 
remains committed to eventual NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine. The American 
military continues to conduct joint exercises with regimes Moscow considers inimical. In short, 
on this issue the two countries have diametrically opposed views. While conflict may be 
contained through skillful diplomacy, cooperation is not in the cards.  
 Finally, one might think Russia would value American assistance in its fight against 
Islamic terrorism. In practice, however, distrust and divergent approaches limit the space for 
cooperation. Although neither Washington nor the Kremlin wants to see Islamic jihadists 
strengthened in the North Caucasus, their views of the underlying problem differ so greatly that 
discussions produce mostly irritation. When they look at the North Caucasus, most in Washington 
see rampant abuses of human rights by state officials; what the Kremlin sees is a war on terror. 
Russian leaders have become cynical about Western objectives and increasingly doubtful about 
US strategy in the Middle East (as we discuss below). Putin does not understand why Britain and 
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the US granted political asylum to the Chechen leaders Akhmed Zakayev and Ilyas Akhmadov, 
whom he considers the emissaries of a terrorist movement. Thus, although exchanges of 
intelligence may occur, Russia does not have much use for the type of assistance the US could 
conceivably offer.  
With very few exceptions, Russia does not need—or want—help from Washington in 
achieving its main objectives. What “help” it would value is almost entirely negative: it would 
like the US to stop interfering in its neighborhood, militarizing the border states, and attempting 
to undermine Russia‟s position in energy markets.  
Even if they do not see eye to eye in these areas, Russia might still hope the US would 
succeed in some of its global endeavors. Surely, some suggest, defeating the Taliban, preventing 
nuclear proliferation, and stopping climate change are goals Moscow should share. This is not 
completely wrong. However, even when it is true, Russia‟s leaders generally place much lower 
priority on the policies in question. And Russia often has countervailing interests. At the same 
time, Moscow frequently doubts the effectiveness of the strategies Washington chooses and so is 
reluctant to sacrifice its other interests to support American actions that it thinks unlikely to 
succeed.  
 For instance, the Kremlin has no desire to see Afghanistan controlled again by the 
Taliban. A victory for radical Islamists there could embolden insurgencies throughout Central 
Asia and invigorate the North Caucasus‟s terrorist networks. However, Russian officials are 
unsure NATO has the capacity and determination to defeat the Taliban or impose a stable 
settlement before it leaves. They wonder whether the US, with its operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, 
and Pakistan, is actually weakening Islamic forces there or merely toughening them up. Like 
Hamid Karzai, they are looking ahead to what will happen after US troops depart. The Kremlin 
does not want to take positions now that will make it impossible to deal with Kabul‟s future 
power-holders.  
24 
 
 Many other considerations also come into play. Although afraid of too much instability, 
Russian leaders know that some level of tension helps keep their southern neighbors in line. 
Threatened by the Taliban, the Central Asians are readier to cooperate in the Moscow-led 
Collective Security Treaty Organization and to welcome Russia‟s military presence in the region. 
At the same time, Russia is uncomfortable with the new American military footprint to its south. 
And it is concerned about Afghan opium production, which has more than doubled since the US 
invaded.
47
 Much of the heroin lands in Russia, where drug addiction has soared. Finally, the 
public is far less happy than Putin and Medvedev about cooperation with NATO over 
Afghanistan. In September 2009, 61 percent of Russians opposed the decision to let NATO ship 
military cargoes across Russia, while only 21 supported it.
48
 All this renders the Kremlin‟s 
ambivalence understandable.  
 Iran evokes another set of complicated calculations. Of course, Russia would prefer that 
Tehran not develop nuclear weapons. Yet many doubt that even the toughest economic sanctions, 
fully backed by Russia, would be enough to prevent this, given the Iranian regime‟s 
determination. At the same time, Russia has interests in Iran that would be costly to jeopardize. 
Its exports to the country have grown from just $250 million in 1995 to $3.3 billion in 2008—still 
less than one percent of Russia‟s total, but enough to energize Moscow‟s pro-Tehran lobby. 
Russia hopes for more large contracts to build additional nuclear power stations, develop oil and 
gas fields, and supply Iran with modern weapons. It does not want to give Tehran‟s radicals an 
excuse to support Islamic terrorists in the North Caucasus.  
On the other hand, Russia‟s commercial and strategic interests would also be threatened 
by a complete resolution of the conflict between Tehran and Washington. Were peace to break 
out, Western investment might flood the Iranian oil and gas sectors, competing with Russian 
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multinationals. The lifting of sanctions and lowering of tensions would depress petroleum prices. 
New pipelines might be built to carry Iranian gas to Europe.  
In many ways, the current stalemate serves the Kremlin‟s purposes. Russia‟s ideal 
outcome would probably be renewed—perhaps even tougher—sanctions, but ones for which 
Tehran blamed the West, not Russia, and which included ambiguities or waivers permitting 
Russian commercial ventures to continue. That is almost exactly what the Kremlin obtained in 
June 2010: under the UN sanctions resolution, Russia can continue to build Tehran nuclear power 
stations. Although it later chose not to, Moscow also insisted the sanctions allowed it to complete 
a controversial deal to sell Iran advanced S-300 anti-aircraft missiles.
49
 Right after the UN vote, 
the Russian energy minister met in Moscow with his Iranian counterpart to sign a joint “roadmap 
for energy cooperation.”50 Although US legislation penalizes firms that invest more than $20 
million in Iran‟s petroleum industry, President Obama can waive such penalties, and is expected 
to do so with regard to Russian and Chinese companies. In short, Tehran is hemmed in, US and 
European competitors are kept out, and Russia‟s corporations—although they must tread 
carefully—can continue to develop the Iranian market. Likewise, Russia is not happy to see a 
nuclear North Korea. But, again, its leaders doubt that even their active cooperation with 
Washington would lead Pyongyang to disarm.  
The new START treaty of April 2010 mostly ratified cuts in the Russian arsenal that 
were occurring anyway as weapons aged. It is not clear further major reductions would serve 
Russia‟s interests. As anti-missile systems become more accurate and powerful, Moscow will 
need to maintain enough missiles and warheads to remain sure of a second strike capability. 
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Military planners will likely become nervous about reductions below the 700 delivery systems 
and 1,550 warheads of the updated treaty.  
 On climate change, Russia—unlike the US—signed the Kyoto Protocol. In 2003, 
President Putin suggested that a slight increase in the temperature might benefit a snowbound 
country like Russia: “We could spend less on fur coats, and the grain harvest would go up.”51 
Given the devastating fires caused by Russia‟s unusually hot summer of 2010, he will probably 
not be repeating this remark.  Jokes aside, the Kremlin has recognized for some time that global 
warming would impose huge costs, causing floods and destroying infrastructure. Still, how the 
expense of cutting pollution should be shared among the major industrial and industrializing 
countries remains contentious. Like other countries, Russia has a powerful pro-carbon lobby.  
 
Looking forward: Russia in Europe 
Given how American and Russian leaders construe their national interests today, the bases for 
cooperation are narrow. As with China, Washington should not expect much help from Moscow, 
not because Kremlin officials are overwhelmed by wounded pride and paranoia, but because 
Washington‟s priorities are not their priorities—and may not be in Russia‟s interest at all.  
 The parallel with China is instructive. In dealing with Beijing, US policymakers seem to 
perceive conflicts of interest for what they are. They do not feel compelled to patronize and 
psychoanalyze their Chinese counterparts. It is hard to imagine an American leader on the eve of 
a Beijing summit berating President Hu Jintao for his obsolete Marxist mentality and promising 
to “build up” Premier Wen Jiabao as a counterweight.  
 Even moments of serious military tension have not been allowed to derail the US-China 
relationship. In 2001, a Chinese fighter jet smashed into a US reconnaissance plane it had been 
trailing, forcing the latter to make an emergency landing in Hainan. The 24 American crew 
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members were held captive by the Chinese military, interrogated around the clock, and only 
allowed to leave 11 days later after the US delivered a formal apology and paid $34,000 for the 
crew‟s food and lodging.52 The incident had almost no consequences for US-China relations. A 
few months later, China was allowed to join the WTO, and the next year President Bush 
welcomed China‟s leader Jiang Zemin to his Texas ranch. Had the Russian military forced down 
a US plane, then imprisoned and interrogated its crew, it is inconceivable that cordial relations 
would have resumed so fast.  
 To be clear, in spelling out the purposes behind Russian foreign policy we are not arguing 
that the country‟s citizens and leaders are cold-blooded calculating machines. The public does 
feel some regret at the loss of superpower status. Russian officials—like those elsewhere—do 
sometimes react emotionally or engage in short-sighted populism, and they are not always 
competent. Our point is that on major issues Russia‟s leaders have pursued a reasonably plausible 
conception of their country‟s interests.  
 If a close relationship between Moscow and Washington is unlikely in the next few years, 
in the longer run there are grounds for greater optimism. While its interactions with the US have 
shrunk in the last decade, Russia has, as it has grown richer, been gradually integrating into 
Europe, both economically and culturally. Because these changes are slow and un-dramatic, they 
have gone largely unnoticed. As it develops further, we believe Russia will, without losing its 
distinct identity, become even more European.  
 Since 1995, the number of Russians traveling to countries beyond the former Soviet 
Union has more than doubled. Russia‟s neighbors and trade partners have been the main 
destinations. In 2008, Russians made 39 times as many trips to Western Europe or Scandinavia 
and 19 times as many trips to China as they did to the US.
53
 More and more Russians study 
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abroad—41,000 in 2008, according to UNESCO, up from 20,000 in 1999. Of these 41,000, 
20,000 were at institutions in Europe, East or West. Only 5,000 were in the US.
54
  
Russians have been buying houses and apartments abroad. They spend an estimated $10 
billion on foreign real estate each year, although given the secrecy of many transactions the total 
could be much larger. According to the international realtor Gordon Rock, the five most popular 
destinations in 2009 were Bulgaria, Montenegro, Germany, Spain, and the Czech Republic. The 
US came sixth.
55
 This does not represent just oligarchs buying Mediterranean villas. Realtors 
report also a considerable demand for cheap apartments around Berlin, Stuttgart, and London.
56
  
Although Russians do not necessarily consider themselves European yet, attitudes are 
changing. Asked with which countries Russia should cooperate most in its foreign policy, 50 
percent in April 2010 said Western Europe, more even than said Ukraine, Belarus and the CIS. 
(Thirty percent said the US.
57
) A majority—53 percent—said in 2009 that they would favor 
Russia joining the European Union if given the chance, compared to 21 percent who would 
oppose this and 27 percent who did not know.
58
 Almost two thirds of members of the Russian 
middle class would like their children to study and work in the West, according to another poll, 
and more than one third would be happy if their children lived there forever.
59
  
These trends are likely to continue. Even if Russia‟s average growth rate slows to four 
percent, in ten years‟ time it will have broken into the income range of Western Europe‟s poorer 
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countries. It will be as rich as Portugal is today, and richer than New Zealand was in 2001. As the 
country develops, its middle class will continue to expand and integrate into Europe. At some 
point—although when exactly is impossible to predict—there will be a political turnover, a 
liberalization of institutions, and a serious effort to control corruption. Even as its trade with 
China increases, we believe Russia‟s cultural identity will become more solidly rooted in the 
West. Eventually, although not soon, the idea of Russia joining the EU may become a serious 
one.  
In the short run, relations with Europe—especially Eastern and Central Europe—will 
involve conflict as well as mutual benefit. Integration creates reciprocal vulnerability and 
motivates a struggle over who will get the gains from trade. The energy market is the most 
obvious example. It is possible that clashes of economic interests will ignite a political crisis that 
will impede Russia‟s Europeanization. More likely, such conflicts will be managed successfully.  
Even if, as we predict, Russia and the US do not develop a close partnership in the next 
decade, relations can still be constructive. A narrow relationship does not need to be a bad one, 
and the rhetoric of the last year or so suggests that both Medvedev and Putin would like the tone 
to improve. The main prerequisite—paradoxical as it might seem—is that the two sides recognize 
the limits of their shared interests. If those in Washington expect too much, frustrated hopes will 
once again lead to suspicion, new forays into psychoanalysis, and counterproductive 
overreactions. 
Apart from the occasional burst of patronizing rhetoric, the Obama Administration has 
generally engaged Russia in a pragmatic way during the last two years. This has paid off in just 
the sort of limited but worthwhile progress one might have predicted—the new START treaty of 
April 2010, the deal permitting NATO shipments to Afghanistan across Russian territory, the 
Russian vote in the UN Security Council for sanctions against Iran. The matter-of-fact way in 
which Washington treated the discovery of a dozen undercover Russian agents in June 2010 was 
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very much in this mode. A few years earlier, such a discovery would have led to high-decibel 
denunciations, disrupting contacts for months. 
 Such pragmatism means accepting that the US can do little in practice to further Russia‟s 
democratization, and that attempts to do so often backfire. Continued growth and integration into 
Europe, while they certainly do not guarantee convergence, are the best hope for it. The more 
Russian elites are bound into European networks—through tourism, education, business 
partnerships, and social contacts—the greater will be their stake in cordial relations. For the EU, 
relaxing visa requirements for Russians to travel to Europe would accelerate the process. 
Pragmatism also means letting Europe take the lead in defining its own relationship with the 
power to its east.  
 For a superpower overstretched by the mission of solving global problems without 
imposing sacrifice on its citizens, such a recognition should not be unwelcome. Rather than 
seeking to cure Russia, the US in the next decade will need to deal with Russia—much as it deals 
with China, India, and many other states. The good news is that, on matters that are genuinely of 
mutual interest, Russia is ready to deal.  
